Using tactics borrowed from European and Native American warfare and consisting of colonists with little, if any, experience in warfare, but unified by their thirst for liberty, the Continental Army was at once similar to, but also fundamentally different from any army that preceded it. Indeed—and somewhat appropriately, given its role in securing independence in the American Revolution—the Continental Army was uniquely American.
In many ways, the Continental Army was a product of the 17th Century conflicts between Native Americans and Europeans, both of whom had long-held, deep-rooted, and fundamentally different philosophies and strategies concerning the nature of war and how it should be fought. Native Americans preferred short tactical raids that entailed objectives such as righting a wrong committed by another tribe or forcing a weaker tribe to pay tribute. The idea and practicality of taking and holding land or fighting on open battlefields made no sense to the Natives because they were simply not very interested in whole societies involving themselves in mostly regional and small scale affairs. Europeans had grown up in a much different society. Territorial conquest and total war had been at the center of European warfare. This can be seen even as far back as the Crusades in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries. Europeans fought to not only take the land, but also kill everyone they came in contact with. They wanted decisive battles where large armies would battle to the last man if necessary. These tactics were very foreign to the Natives and the Natives’ tactics were equally as foreign to the Colonists during this time. The collision of these different approaches was horrific, but also educational for both sides. “Through violent encounters, including several near catastrophic wars, English colonists and Native Americans were forced to alter their concepts of warfare.” These philosophies were carried on into and through the American Revolution and heavily influenced the Continental Army. The Powhatan War was one of the first conflicts that reflected this distinctly American melding of military philosophies. The conflict erupted in Virginia on March 22, 1622—Good Friday for the Christian colonists—when Native Americans, led by Opechancanough, launched coordinated attacks throughout the Virginia colony, killing 347 people—almost one third of the colonial population of Virginia at that time. The attacks were distinctly Native American in their use of guerilla warfare tactics. But the Native Americans also implemented fundamentally European tactics when they laid siege on the Colonial strongholds. Despite the new techniques, the European militia subdued the attacks and, shortly thereafter, adopted a tactic that was new to the colonies, but well worn in military history, and infused it with techniques acquired from the Native Americans. The new, but actually well-established European philosophy, “total war,” undergirded the next century of European and Native American conflict through other notable conflicts such as the Pequot War, King Phillip’s War, and King William’s War. Europeans believed strongly in the concept of “total war,” or the total destruction of the enemy. While resulting in a significant death toll, the Native Americans’ Good Friday raids were essentially terroristic—endeavoring to make the colonists fearful of the Natives. “Total war” took that approach to another level. Europeans had practiced this for many years in notable conflicts such as the Thirty Years War. The objective was not merely to win, but to successfully wipe out and destroy the fighting spirit of the opposing force. It was both a physical and psychological onslaught. The Europeans implemented “total war” with a distinctive blending of European philosophy--such as sieges and open field warfare - and Native American philosophy - such as small raiding parties, guerilla tactics and patiently waiting for the enemy. “Total war,” coupled with disease, ultimately pushed the Native Americans to the brink of extinction. The differences of philosophies clashed further in the French and Indian or The Seven Years War. The British believed in the traditional European tactic of forming ranks and marching at the oncoming enemy, while the French integrated more and more into the ways of the Native Americans. The French began blending the traditional European style tactics with the Native American tactics, the most effective example being the British defeat at the Battle of Monongahela led by General Edward Braddock. Braddock believed in the European style of open warfare, forming ranks and decisive battle. The French, knowing they were out numbered, trapped the British on the road by sending the Native Americans and a few French soldiers to the left and right flanks of the British expeditionary force while French regulars marched straight on toward the British position. Because of the flanking fire, Braddock was mortally wounded and panic ensued within the British ranks causing them to retreat while loosing 63 officers and 914 men killed or wounded. Therefore, the French successfully had combined the traditional Europeans tactics with the Native American tactics. While the British eventually won the war, the colonists themselves gained valuable experience about the type of warfare they had been facing and even using in some cases. Unfortunately, the British did not have the same foresight the colonists and did not purse tactics that had been used against them. This battle and war heavily influenced a young Colonel George Washington who was a ranking officer serving under Gen. Braddock. This in turn heavily influenced the formation, training and tactics of the Continental Army. By the spring of 1775, the rebel militia in New England had proved itself twice in battle, once at Lexington and Concord and again at Breeds Hill (commonly know as Bunker Hill). “[T]he…war could not be fought exclusively in New England,” however, and “[b]road-scale popular defense of liberty required the involvement of as many colonies as possible.” In May of 1775, the leaders of the army in Massachusetts asked Congress to form a “citizens army” to help reinforce them. Congress did so and formed ten companies of rifleman from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. George Washington officially accepted the appointment by the Second Continental Congress to lead the Continental Army on June 16, 1775 and assumed command of the Colonial forces in Cambridge, Mass. on July 3, 1775. Congress also appointed 4 Major Generals and 8 Brigadier Generals. The Major Generals consisted of Artemas Ward, Israel Putnam (the hero of Bunker Hill, or Breeds Hill), Phillip Schuyler and Charles Lee. Thus, the structure of the Continental Army was set. This regular army was to co-exist with the militia already in place at Boston, a unique idea for 18th century standing armies. Washington hoped that by forming this Continental Army, he could help unify the cause of the colonials. Instead of having a military faction from and supported only by the 13 separate colonies, the Continental Army was to be formed and act as a kind of guideline to help the militia become a viable fighting force as representatives of the 13 colonies as a whole. George Washington now had a monumental task ahead of him; he was to make this happen. Taking a force of volunteers who had little to no military experience, hardly any discipline as well as giving credence to the authority of the Colonial government, who he believed had the ultimate control. In essence, the Army was commanded by the military but taking its direction from the Continental Congress, a relatively new idea in western society. The anti-standing army (or anti-professional army) sentiments have their basis in earlier centuries in England with Oliver Cromwell who in the 15th century in England has successfully used his Puritan standing army as a way to keep himself in power after the English Civil War was over. This ant-standing (or anti-professional) army view was further compounded by the Quartering Act the decade previous when Colonists were forced to have British troops live with them and were expected to feed them and generally take care of them. Congress could see many of the dangers of military coups throughout history and feared that having a standing army had the potential to over throw the government they were endeavoring to build. Instead they sought to have a militia or “citizen-solider” army. In this way, Congress could disband the Army at any time. The proponents of a standing professional army during this time however saw a standing or professional army as a necessity to be able to stand up against the British, arguably the most well trained and disciplined army of the time. Washington especially was the champion of having a standing army. He believed that the only way to stand up to the British regulars was to have “discipline and…a core of malleable, long-term enlistees” that were trained and would not simply walk away. In Washington’s mind, this was the only way to beat the British regulars, the Continental Army had to have order and discipline. This debate between Washington and Congress went back and forth from the latter part of 1775 until the summer and fall of 1776. The romance of having a “citizen-solider” army came to an abrupt halt in 1776 with four main factors contributing to Congress subsequently creating the professional colonial army as determined by historian John Todd White. The factors are as follows:
1) The British were hiring Hessian mercenaries
2) The arrival of a large British Army in Quebec, effectively driving Colonists our of that province
3) The concentration of British troops on Staten Island
4) The utter failure of enlistment-appears and a lax military code The summer and fall of 1776, Congress began to establish a professional or respectable army. Forming “88 battalions of 738 officers and men each” and also began state to request the individual states to meet their quotas and supply troops based on population size. Washington’s work of disciplining and transitioning a militia army into a professional army could now begin. With an introduction of a little known foreign officer by the name of Baron von Steuben, the professional army would be essentially overhauled and rebuilt from the ground up. Von Steuben was a Prussian officer who had fought in Europe previously. After talking with Congress, it was agreed that after he had proved his worth to the Colonial Army, he would be awarded pay and rank accordingly. Von Steuben was assigned an almost insurmountable task; discipline the army and turning it into a disciplined, well-organized professional army. From the beginning, the Colonials had a great respect for Von Steuben. Despite the fact that he could barely speak English and relied mainly on grunts, pointing and cursing; he was able to mold the Colonial Army into a well-trained and well-disciplined army. He relentlessly drilled the troops under his command and demanded that officers lead the training and discipline of the troops under their command. Before this, it was left up to the non-commissioned officers who were already overburdened with other responsibilities. Von Steuben even prepared a drill manual standardizing drill techniques; which was standardly used in the American army until the War of 1812. The army that left Valley Forge that summer was much more disciplined and ready to fight than they had been before Von Steuben began to teach order and discipline. Because of this, George Washington and the Colonials were able to pull off something that many other nations were not able to do until that time, beat the British professional army. Washington’s position and leadership style is one of the most unique and intriguing approaches in history. He was placed in a situation that most other leaders would not have been able to withstand. The seemingly endless amount of crises, from desertion to starvation to lack of pay to treason from a high-ranking officer could crack any leader, no matter how experienced they were. However, George Washington was able to keep it all together throughout the War for Independence and begin a military tradition that is still kept today. Even though the standing professional army in the United States has varied in size over the years, the fact still remains that the Army that Washington helped to form and discipline still stands today.
William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 8 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 8 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 8 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 8 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), pg. 11 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 7 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 7 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 11 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 12 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 11-12 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 10, 12, 154 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 11 William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 29
David McCullough, 1776 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 49
James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic 1763-1789 (Illinois: Harlan Davidson Inc., 2006), 38
David McCullough, 1776 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 49, 59
1) James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic 1763-1789 (Illinois: Harlan Davidson Inc., 2006)
2) David McCullough, 1776 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005)
3) William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine, American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007)
