During the course of this post, I believe that discussing the clash both the political and military ideals of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam as well as the United States of America during what is commonly known as the Vietnam War will give a better understanding, as Carl Von Clausewitz, a noted Napoleonic Military Theorist states, “the nature of the whole.” [1] First, I will look into the political clashes that festered during the Vietnam War between the DRV and the U.S. Second I will discuss the military theories of each side as well as the successes and failures of each.
Political and Military Origins of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
The Indochinese Communist Party, or as it became known later, the Vietnam Workers’ Party was formed in 1930.[2] Their stated mission was to lead “the national democratic revolution of the Vietnamese people against the imperialists and the feudal landlord classes.” [3] At this time, the French had invaded and begun occupying Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Korea) and Southeast Asia since the mid 19th Century. [4] After World War I, the fight for independence began to gain wide scale support throughout the whole nation of Vietnam.[5] However, with the beginning of World War II in 1939, Vietnam and Indochina as a whole began to fall to the Japanese Imperial Army until August 1945 when the Japanese surrendered to the Allied forces. [6] On September 2, 1945 in Hanoi, the provisional government of The Democratic Republic of Vietnam officially decaled it’s independence, placing President Ho Chi Mihn as it’s leader.[7] Just a few short weeks later on September 23, 1945 the French Expeditionary Corps began attacking South Vietnam beginning with Saigon.[8] From the perspective of the Vietnamese government, the fight for freedom had now begun. From that time forward, the political aim of the DRV was to gain independence and freedom for their country from the imperialist invaders.
Military Doctrinal Origins of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
The military doctrinal origins of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam go hand in hand with the political origins. According to Clausewitz, “war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.”[9] This helps us understand the three long-term revolutionary strategies of the Viet Minh postulated by General Vo Nguyen Giap:
1) Stage of Contention
2) Stage of Equilibrium
3) Stage of counter-offensive [10]
1) Stage of Contention
2) Stage of Equilibrium
3) Stage of counter-offensive [10]
The first stage will include the forming of a political party.[11] In Vietnam’s case, the party formed was Vietnam Workers Party and from there the insurgent forces, in this case the Viet Minh, begin stirring up and proselyting among the people. [12] The second stage the guerilla forces must begin forming based on the support of the people through attacking local government entities and recruiting forces from these villages after they have successfully infiltrated it.[13] This becomes the most critical part of the operation; the guerilla forces in any way possible must win the will of the people. [14] The overall goal of these insurgent forces becomes to maintain access to the population through attacking vulnerable government entities in hit and run tactics and convincing the population that the government is weak and cannot protect them.[15] In essence, the guerilla warriors must become so deeply imbedded within the population that it is nearly impossible to distinguish between them and the population. Without this support from the people, Mao said that is it nothing more than “roving banditism.” [16] The third and final stage consists of insurgents beginning open warfare against its’ enemy. [17] This is where the concept of insurgency warfare and so called conventional warfare work together. [18] While the insurgent forces do begin to have open warfare battles against the governmental forces, they also have guerilla forces remain embedded in the population, ensuring that the population is still loyal to the insurgents. [19] If the timing on the part of the insurgents is correct, then the insurgent forces will be able to “forge a strong organization and consolidate his strength.” [20]
Political and Military Origins of the United States in Southeast Asia
The U.S. interests in Indochina center around its’ concerns over Western Europe in the middle of the Cold War. [21] As was mentioned earlier, the French had invaded Vietnam in the mid 19th Century, but during World War II had been over run by the Japanese Imperial Army. [22] In essence, the U.S. involvement had little, if anything to do with Vietnam itself, they were trying to help France to become a legitimate political and military contributor to the newly formed NATO that drove the U.S. to support them in Vietnam against Ho Chi Mihn and his Communist allies. [23] What at first was simply the U.S. giving financial aid to the French turned quickly into the U.S. taking the role the French once held, which was as the main antagonist to the North Vietnamese.[24] This series of events plays right into Clausiwitzian theory on war, “War is never an Isolated Act.” [25] With the fall of Dien Bien Phu to the DRV in 1954, the French had effectively been defeated in North Vietnam. [26] A few months later a treaty was signed by both the Communist North Vietnamese and French held South Vietnam splitting the country in two. [27] Upon French withdrawal after the treaty was signed, the United States now began picking up the slack. [28]
Gradually the United States began to train and supply the South Vietnamese forces and progressing to direct involvement starting as early as the Eisenhower Administration. [29] From the very beginning the Military and Civil Leadership in the United States could not see eye to eye. When asked by the NSC (National Security Council) to provide an estimate of man power needed to help train the ARVN troops, the JCS submitted that they needed 234,000 man army costing $420 million annually effective in 1954. [30] Allan Dulles of the CIA quickly stonewalled the JCS explaining that the internal security of South Vietnam should be provided by the South Vietnamese themselves. [31] Clausewitz’s helps us to understand just how detrimental this disunity within a government can be when he said, “The political object – the original motive for the war – will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.” [32] The political objective during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was that of containment. [33] The glaring problem with this political agenda however was that inherently, since containment was that of an arms race, they ignored all together the counterinsurgency tactics that the Viet Minh had been using to fight off the French.[34] Though there was this foreign policy of containment, it focused on the conventional wars that could potentially heat up in Europe.[35] So, politically this is what drew the United States in the role of advisors in Vietnam during the Eisenhower administration.
Escalation: Evolution of American Involvement
The Army advisors had arrived in Vietnam beginning in 1950 and throughout the Eisenhower administration to help train and protect the people in South Vietnam at the time. [36] They steadily increased throughout the Eisenhower administration and began to grow even more during the Kennedy Administration eventually reaching 16,000 in 1963 at the time of Pres. Kennedy’s assassination. [37] After Pres. Kenney’s assignation, Vice President Lyndon Johnson became President Lyndon Johnson now having to decide what was best for the future for U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.[38]
Gulf of Tonkin Incident
In August of 1964, Johnson was given to opportunity to escalate the conflict in Vietnam from a few thousand advisors to all out war with the Viet Cong, an incident that has become known as the Gulf of Tonkin incident. [39] On August 6, 1964, the USS Maddox was on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin when they were attacked by a North Vietnamese patrol boat. [40] Next, the USS Maddox was assisted by the USS C. Turner Joy and both vessels were again attacked.[41] This event has been investigated many times and the general consensus has been that these events in fact did not happen. [42] In any case, on August 5, President Johnson made the decision to airstrikes on the enemy and on August 7, 1964, the Tokin Resolution was passed by Congress giving Pres. Johnson the authority “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.[43]
This move parallels Clausewitz’s 5th point, “The Maximum Exertion of Strength.” [44] He states, “If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.” [45] Basically, in order to defeat your enemy you must throw everything you possibly can at him to break down his will to fight and overcome all of his resources. The Conflict in Vietnam now had the full support and power of the United States government behind it. [46]
Conventional Warfare Vs. Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Warfare
In this section, I will be discussing the differences between Conventional Warfare, which the United States Armed Forces primarily used during their time in Vietnam, with a few exceptions.[47] The other is insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, which was used by the North Vietnamese and in part by the U.S.A.F. [48]
From the beginning of the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the U.S.A.F. employed a strategy that was deeply rooted in the same military philosophy of World War I and II.[49] This was a conventional strategy aimed at spending an exuberant amount of money on material, technological advances and armament in and effort to keep the U.S. body count up and the enemy body count down. [50] The conflict in Vietnam however was much different that those of the previous half-century, the enemy in this case did not fight the same way. As was mentioned before, the North Vietnamese fought a guerilla or insurgency style of warfare whose most crucial focus was to have the will of the people. [51] The U.S. strategy of conventional warfare or the strategy of attrition in many ways did just the opposite, they drove they drove the will of the people right into the hands of the waiting North Vietnamese through campaigns such as defoliation. [52] To further compound this, the U.S. commanders also focused heavily on body count numbers as a means of telling how the war effort was going. [53] Unfortunately, early on in the war, there was a major battle that, in the eyes of the commanding officers of the Southeast Asia theatre, validated the conventional strategy.[54] This battle was known as the Battle of Ia Drang Valley. [55]
Battle of Ia Drang Valley:
By October 8, 1965, U.S. strength in Vietnam was 184,314 men. “The pride of the U.S. forces” was the 1st Calvary Division who were assigned to the Central Highlands where the strongest enemy resistance was. [56] After being stationed in that area for approximately a month, the parts of the 1st Calvary Division began to encounter North Vietnamese regiments as Ia Drang Valley on November 14, 1965. [57] The ensuing battle was both bloody and savage, with the Communists suffering over 1200 killed, while U.S. losses exceeded 200.” [58] While this was a technical victory for the U.S. from a purely body count stand point, this was, in the end a crippling blow to the mindset of the commanding officers whose major focus was on body counts.[59] Compounding that was the fact that the North Vietnamese recognized that this was not the time yet to begin phase three of their long term revolutionary plan, they would go back to phase two and continue their guerilla tactics. Because of this, victories such as Ia Drang Valley were hollow because after the Army was done and have evacuated all of their men, the North Vietnamese would simply move back into the territory the Army and just supposedly secured.
Thanh My Trung:
Captain Jim Cooper was the commander of a Marine company operating in the hamlet of Thanh My Trung who were conducting sweeps and patrols of the area to try and oust the Viet Cong’s influence. [60] He became frustrated because he and his men could not distinguish between guerrillas from the population in Thang My Trung.[61] After repeated attempts to force the VC to leave the area, Capt. Cooper decided that he was going to stay inside the village with his men letting the locals know that there were there to protect them from the VC and they were there to stay.[62] Cooper stepped up night patrols and began working heavily with the local forces or Popular Forces to help the locals to assume the primary roll of village security.[63] Eventually, the PF’s did assume a greater roll in disrupting VC activity so much so that the VC eventually abandoned the village.[64] This shows a more permanent victory in two ways:
1) The North Vietnamese were successfully kicked out of the village
2) The locals now had the proper training to maintain village security on their own
Capt. Cooper was not the only officer to recognize the advantages of this strategy. During a trip to Vietnam in December of 1965, General Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff asked some junior officers he was flying with to discuss strategy and tactics. In the response “the young platoon leaders and company commanders told the Chief of Staff that they could not engage the enemy if they were moving around in big outfits. What was needed, they said was to operate in many small units, constantly moving and patrolling.” [65] The General in essence however, ignored their ideas and the capitulation of the philosophy of conventional warfare continued. [66]
Learning and Looking Forward
Clausewitz helps us to understand what the goal of both the U.S. and N.V. in the Vietnam conflict. He says, “If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make.”[67] The North Vietnamese were able to successfully do that, they built their strategy of insurgency tactics and long-term revolutionary plans around the obvious weaknesses of the U.S. military. [68] Therefore, they put the U.S. in a situation they knew they could not handle after an almost rehearsal with the French just a few years earlier. However, on the flip side, the defeat in Vietnam on the part of the U.S. Army led to become very introspective and develop the Special Forces branches. [69] The 1st Special Operation Command (SOCOM) commands Special Forces units such as Army Ranger Battalions and Green Berets. Just as before, the Army if focusing more on counterinsurgency tactics, however, this time the U.S. will not commit any combat forces to a counterinsurgency situation unless the following conditions apply:
1) The interests involved must be vital to U.S. security
2) Troops committed are sufficient in number to accomplish the mission
3) The American political leadership has a clear vision to win
4) An atmosphere of popular and congressional support for the war must be present.[70]
In conclusion, the U.S. military in the Vietnam conflict was from the beginning a failure on the part of the military leadership to recognize the changing face of conflict in the Southeast Asian theatre. In the worlds or General Omar M. Bradley, we can look back at Vietnam as “the wrong war – at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong army. [71]
End Notes:
[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 75.
[2] General Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples War People’s Army. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1962), 12.
[3] Giap, People’s War People’s Army, 12.
[4] Ibid… 12. William T. Allison et al., American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 304.
[5] Giap, People’s War People’s Army, 12.
[6] Giap, People’s War People’s Army, 13.
[7] Giap, People’s War People’s Army, 13.
[8] Ibid… 13
[9] Clausewitz, On War, 87
[10] Giap, People’s War People’s Army, 46-47
[11] Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 7.
[12] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 7. Giap, People’s War People’s Army, 12
[13] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 7.
[14] Ibid… 7-8.
[15] Ibid… 8.
[16] Ibid… 8.
[17] Ibid… 7.
[18] Ibid… 8.
[19] Ibid… 8.
[20] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 8.
[21] Allison et al., American Military History, 304.
[22] Giap, People’s War People’s Army, 11. Ibid… 304.
[23] Allison et al., American Military History, 304.
[24] Ibid… 305.
[25] Clausewitz, On War, 78.
[26] Allison et al., American Military History, 304.
[27] Ibid… 304-305.
[28] Ibid… 304-305.
[29] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 19-20. Allison et al., American Military History, 305.
[30] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 20.
[31] Ibid… 20.
[32] Clausewitz, On War. 81.
[33] Allison et al., American Military History, 283-284.
[34] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 19-20. Allison et al., American Military History, 284.
[35] Allison et al., American Military History, 283-284.
[36] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 3.
[37] Allison et al., American Military History, 306.
[38] Ibid… 306.
[39] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 95.
[40] Ibid… 95.
[41] Ibid… 95.
[42] Allison et al., American Military History, 307.
[43] The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, pp. 722
[44] Clausewitz, On War, 77.
[45] Ibid… 77.
[46] Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, p. 722
[47] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 171-172.
[48] Ibid…171.
[49] Ibid… 164.
[50] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 164.
[51] Ibid… 7-8.
[52] Ibid… 211.
[53] Allison et al., American Military History, 308.
[54] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 192.
[55] Ibid… 168.
[56] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 168-169.
[57] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam,
[58] Ibid… 169.
[59] Allison et al., American Military History, 308.
[60] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 172.
[61] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 173.
[62] Ibid… 173.
[63] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 173.
[64] Ibid… 173.
[65] Ibid… 171-172.
[66] Ibid… 172.
[67] Clausewitz, On War, 77.
[68] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 161.
[69] Ibid… 268.
[70] Ibid… 269.
[71] Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 4.
Bibliography:
1) Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989.
2) William T. Allison, Jeffrey Grey and Janet G. Valentine. American Military History: A
Survey from Colonial Times to the Present. New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007.
3) Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
4) General Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples War People’s Army. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1962.
5) The New York Times, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
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